Re: [TML] Question Doug Grimes (16 Jun 2015 13:59 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (17 Jun 2015 00:47 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (17 Jun 2015 01:06 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (17 Jun 2015 02:23 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (17 Jun 2015 03:32 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (17 Jun 2015 02:19 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (17 Jun 2015 05:52 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Knapp (17 Jun 2015 06:12 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 01:29 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (18 Jun 2015 02:11 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 03:01 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (18 Jun 2015 03:12 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Knapp (18 Jun 2015 10:13 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (19 Jun 2015 01:24 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Joseph Paul (19 Jun 2015 05:28 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question tmr0195@xxxxxx (19 Jun 2015 05:37 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (19 Jun 2015 10:31 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Knapp (19 Jun 2015 10:40 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Tim (19 Jun 2015 13:06 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question tmr0195@xxxxxx (19 Jun 2015 13:34 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Tim (20 Jun 2015 06:02 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question tmr0195@xxxxxx (19 Jun 2015 13:31 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Bruce Johnson (19 Jun 2015 16:49 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kelly St. Clair (19 Jun 2015 17:05 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (19 Jun 2015 13:35 UTC)
Traveller Wiki Question Brett Kruger (19 Jun 2015 06:39 UTC)
Re: [TML] Traveller Wiki Question Thomas Jones-Low (20 Jun 2015 03:51 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (17 Jun 2015 13:48 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 02:44 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (18 Jun 2015 02:52 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 04:48 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (18 Jun 2015 10:05 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 11:12 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (18 Jun 2015 10:00 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Greg Chalik (18 Jun 2015 11:10 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese (18 Jun 2015 13:34 UTC)
Re: [TML] Question Kurt Feltenberger (18 Jun 2015 17:28 UTC)

Re: [TML] Question Phil Pugliese 18 Jun 2015 10:00 UTC

--------------------------------------------
On Wed, 6/17/15, Greg Chalik <mrg3105@gmail.com> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [TML] Question
 To: "tml@simplelists.com" <tml@simplelists.com>
 Date: Wednesday, June 17, 2015, 7:44 PM

 On 17 June 2015 at
 23:48, Phil Pugliese (via tml list) <nobody@simplelists.com>
 wrote:
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 We'll never know but then we'll also never know how
 well soviet equip, doctrine, & logistics would have
 fared either.

  We can theorize but we can't know for sure.

 ===================================
 ​Actually
 no. WP forces effectively re-occupied Czechoslovakia and
 Hungary using the same 'theoretical' doctrine and
 equipment, and NATO wasn't able to do much about those
 operations.​ 
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The WP ops w/i Czech & Hun were hardly ';hot-war- exercises & since NATO *chose* ( not could n't) to do nothing means that we'll never know what would've happened.
We can only *theorize*..

 ========================================================
  Neither I not

  the Soviets were theorising.

 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 Sure they were. They were theorizing how future ops would
 unfold & how to equip their forces in order to prevail.

 ========================================================================================
 ​The
 operation to occupy West Germany was designed in late-1944,
 and was only modified from time to time based on increased
 capabilities.​ 

  You can ask the

  question why immediately after the war the first

  'IFV' designs produced were

  the BTR-152 and BTR-50. The answer is the same as for
 BTR-60

  and BMP-1.

  The basis of

  designs was wartime experience that was worked out in the

  1930s, and executed

  in over 70 operational-strategic operations between 1941
 and

  1945, admittedly

  with varying, but mostly successful results. By 1945 the
 Red

  Army had it down

  to a fairly good formula.

  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 The theories they 'worked out' in the '30's
 didn't work out so well when put to the test.

 Not even during the 'Winter War' against Finland in
 1940 & esp so in 1941.

 It took real-life experience to work-out the kinks.

 In the end the standard soviet tactics typically involved
 horrifyingly high casualties that other nations weren't
 willing to accept as SOP.

 =========================================================================
 ​The
 theories that were worked out in the late-20s and early 30s
 worked very well because they were jointly developed by the
 Soviet and Weimar officers (discontinued after 1933).
 They
 didn't work very well in Finland because of the Red
 Army's command structure and organisational culture, and
 because the Finns managed to put in place a far better
 defencive system than the Red Army thought.
 From
 1941 Moscow offensive onwards the theories worked
 increasingly well as all echelons of command gained more
 expereince.
 ​ ​"In
 the end the standard soviet tactics typically involved
 horrifyingly
 high casualties that other nations weren't willing to
 accept as SOP." - I put this statement down to your
 lack of awareness of Second World War history.
 The
 Red Army suffered 8 million in military casualties, of which
 4 million were suffered in the first six months of the
 war.​ (Casualties mean those not returned to combat, so
 include POWs.
 The
 tactics that involved "horrifyingly high
 casualties" were predominantly evident during the
 forementioned initial six months of the war (Summer-Autumn
 1941).
 As
 for other nations and their tactics, you only need to read
 about the Polish and French desperate counter-attacks in
 1939-40, British infantry attacks during the Normandy
 breakout attempts or the USMC assaults of Japanese-held
 islands to know how wrong you are. Sometimes there is no
 alternative to a frontal assault. Japanese did it though
 they conquered much of Asia through a virtually bloodless
 strategy of operational manoeuvre, and Germans did it in the
 late war though they were supposed to be masters of
 manoeuvre tactics. Just read about the fortress-cities.
 So
 that leaves one nation I guess.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I only need to read articles written by just about everyone else except you to realize how wrong you are.

========================================================================================

  Chobham armour

  is a noteworthy but not entirely relevant factor in the

  development of correlation of forces in Cold War Europe.
 It

  matters at the

  tactical employment of forces, but is irrelevant

  operationally.

 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 Well you're the 1st person I've read that has said
 that.

 I'm going to have to side with the numerous others that
 disagree w/ you.

 ==========================================================
 ​Ok.​ 

 No one in

  Soviet Union ever talked about the 'death of the

  MBT'.

  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 I never said they did.

 Still, I encountered many folks (& read a lot more) that
 consistently beat that drum & then shut up after the new
 armor appeared.

 =============================================================================================​Its not
 about new armour. There is a plethora of companies selling
 new armour invented in just the last decade. The problem is
 not armour, but how to get this armour onto a beach half a
 World away in the numbers needed, affordably &
 efficiently, and still achieve strategic needs. Do you see
 the British Empire on your map of the World? Do you know
 what armoured vehicle the British Royal Navy Marines use? It
 doesn't have Chobham​ armour. It has Swedish armour,
 and very thin armour at that. The RM brigade is not a
 strategic or even operational force to project. Its a
 tactical fleet force that can do 'odd jobs' as long
 as they don't come up against heavy conventional forces.
 The USMC is in the same 'boat' if you pardon the
 pun.
 .
 The reason
 I'm the first person you hear talk this way about
 Chobham armour is because everyone else talks about tactics,
 but professionals think about logistics FIRST. Most
 professionals though have careers and families to support.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Or the real reason that  you're the 1st person is that all the others have correctly rejected your outlier analyses.

==================================================================================================